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Goodman fl. Lukens Steel Co.: 
PERSONAL INJURY STATUTE OF 
UMlTATIONS NOW APPLIED TO 
TInE VII ClAIMS BROUGHT IN 
PENNSYLVANIA 
In Goodman fl. Lukens Steel Co., 
_U.S---. 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987), the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the Pennsylvania personal injury statute of 
limitations should be applied to all claims 
in that state arising under Tide vn of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court further 
ruled that the personal injury two year 
statute of limitations should be applied 
retroactively to all prior cases where there 
was no clear precedent to guide the parties 
to the suit. 
In the case at bar, black employees of a 
Pennsylvania steel company brought a 
class action suit against their employer, 
Lukens Steel, and their collective 
bargaining agents, the United Steelworkers 
of America, and two of their local unions. 
The employees alleged violations of both 
Tide vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and 42 U.S.c. S 1981. The district court 
ruled that the steel company had violated 
Tide vn by discharging employees during 
their probationary period, tolerating racial 
harassment by employees, and using 
certain proscribed practices involving 
initial job assignments, promotions, and 
decisions on incentive pay. By these same 
actions the district court also found that 
the company had violated 42 U.S.c. 
S 1981. Similarly, the court found that the 
unions also violated both statutes by 
discriminating on racial grounds in failing 
to challenge discriminatory discharges of 
probationary employees, failure and 
refusal to assert racial discrimination as a 
ground for grievances, and toleration and 
tacit encouragement of racial harassment. 
In assessing damages, the court ruled that 
the Pennsylvania six year statute of 
limitations governing contract claims 
applied to S 1981 claims. Thus, in 
determining damages, the court would 
consider all violations that occurred in the 
six year period prior to the institution of 
suit. Lukens Steel appealed on the grounds 
that the district court applied the wrong 
statute of limitations, and the unions based 
their appeal on a claim that Tide vn and 
S 1981 were erroneously applied. 
The Supreme Court agreed that the six 
year statute of limitations was not the 
correct statute to apply. Relying on Wilson 
fl. Garda, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Court 
held that since S 1981 does not contain a 
statute of limitations, federal courts should 
select the most appropriate or analogous 
state statute of limitations. The district 
court held that the most analogous statute 
was the one applicable to suits for 
interference with contractual rights, a six 
year statutue of limitations. Lukens Steel 
argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, 
that S 1981 has a much broader focus than 
contractual rights, because U[t]he section 
speaks not only of personal rights to 
contract, but personal rights to sue, to 
testify, and to equal rights under all laws 
for the security of persons and property; 
and all persons are to be subject to like 
punishments, taxes and burdens of every 
kind." Goodman, 107 S. Ct. at 2621. Thus, 
S 1981 is part of a law which considers 
racial discrimination an injury to the 
fundamental rights of an individual, and 
the proper statute of limitations to apply is 
the Pennsylvania two year statute of 
limitations that governs personal injury 
claims. 
The plaintiff argued that the statute 
should not be retroactively applied 
because prior Third Circuit decisions held 
that the proper statute was six years. 
However, the Court felt that retroactivity 
was appropriate in this case because at the 
time of the filing of this suit, 1973, "there 
had been no authoritative specification of 
which statute of limitations applied to an 
employee's S 1981 claims, and hence no 
clear precedent on which petitioner could 
have relied when they filed their 
complaint in this case." Id. at 2622. It was 
not until 1977, in Myers fl. Pennypack 
Woods Home Ownership Association, 559 
F.2d 894 (1977), that the Third Circuit 
adopted the six year statute of limitations. 
The Court also refused to overturn the 
lower court's finding that the unions 
illegally discriminated against the 
plaintiffs. Although the unions claim that 
the trial court erred in holding that the 
union violated Tide vn and S 1981 by 
passively not opposing an employer's 
racially discriminatory employment 
practices, the Court did not address this 
argument. Rather, it cited the lower court 
fmding that there was more than mere 
passivity on the part of the unions, and 
announced that there is an affirmative 
duty on the part of the unions to challenge 
the employer when instances of alleged 
racial discrimination arise. Based on this 
decision and the fact that there was more 
than just mere acquiescence on the part of 
the unions, the Court rejected the unions' 
appeal. 
The Supreme Court's fmding in this case 
is significant because the statute of 
limitations governing personal injury 
claims in Pennsylvania has been reduced 
from six years to two and the Court has 
announced that it should be applied 
retroactively in cases filed before a clear 
precedent existed to guide the parties. In 
addition, the Court has also restated that 
unions have an affirmative duty to 
challenge discriminatory practices by 
employers whenever they arise. 
-David Carey 
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Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
RIGHT ON SCHEDULE! 
Maryland 
Drunk-Driving Fatalities: 
1982 ..... 336 1985 .. ... 370 
1983 ..... 358 ~~~!!!!!!!! 
1984 ..... 331 1986 ..... 356 
Is this to be socially accepted MURDER? 
With this continuing carnage, plus having over 
10,000 personal injuries per year all due to drunk-
driving, Maryland will never be America's best-
• UNLESS, Maryland's Drunk-Driving Laws 
are equal or better than most of the other 
49 states. They are not now. 
• UNLESS, Maryland's Judiciary, as a group, 
can find the courage to issue drunk-driving 
sentences which get the drunk off the road. 
They do not now. 
• UNLESS. Maryland's Vehicle Licensing Admin-
istration gets tough on revocation and suspen-
sion of drivers' licenses. They are not now. 
• UNLESS. Maryland's Executive Branch funds 
detention and rehabilitation centers to incarcer-
ate and rehabilitate the drunk driver, especially 
the repeat offender. They do not now. 
MADD NEEDS YOUR HELP! 
CALL NOW 
321-MADD 
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